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Self-Defense in Colorado
by H. PatrickFurman

T

he appellate courts in Colorado
have issued a number of deci-

sions in the past few years dealing with self-defense. While
these decisions did not make significant
breaks with prior case law, they did clarify some issues relating to the defense.
This article reviews the basic law of selfdefense and these recent decisions.

The Basic Principles
The law of self-defense has been codified, along with affirmative defenses generally, in CRS § 18-1-701 et seq. CRS § 181-704 reads:
A person is justified in using physical
force upon another person in order to
defend himself or a third person from
what he reasonably believes to be the
use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he
may use a degree of force which he
reasonably believes to be necessary
for that purpose.'
Subsequent sections establish the "makemy-day law,"2 the right to defend premises, 3 the right to defend property 4 and
5
the right to use force in making an arrest.

Self-defense is an affirmative defense6
-that is, one that generally admits the
doing of the act but offers a legal justification for it. 7 This means that unless the

prosecution's case-in-chief raises evidence of self-defense, a defendant who
wishes to raise self-defense has the burden of presenting "some credible evidence" on the issue.8 Once such evidence
is raised, the burden shifts back to the
prosecution to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 The determination of whether an affirmative de-
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fense has been raised by the evidence is
made by the trial court. 10

In Colorado, a person is entitled to act
on appearances when exercising self-defense: a reasonable belief that you are in
danger entitles you to defend yourself,
even to the extent of taking human life,
even though it may later turn out that
you were mistaken about the danger."i
It also is true in Colorado that a person
who is under attack need not retreat in
the face of that attack before lawfully
exercising the right of self-defense, 123even
to the extent of using deadly force.'
In certain circumstances, an individual may lawfully use self-defense even if
he or she started the fight. An initial aggressor who withdraws from the fight
and communicates this intention to the
other person has the right to lawfully exercise self-defense if the other person,
despite knowledge of the initial aggressor's intent to withdraw, continues the
fight. The initial aggressor must retreat,
however, because the no-retreat doctrine
has generally not been extended to initial aggressors.' 4 It is for the jury to de-

termine whether the initial aggressor
adequately communicated his or her intention to withdraw.15
Self-defense may be used to defend
against most homicide and assault
charges. One exception to this general
proposition is that self-defense is not
available against a charge of felony murderS Other exceptions are discussed below.With the right facts, self-defense may
be used against a charge of resisting ar-

Raising the Defense
As noted, unless the prosecution's casein-chief raises evidence of self-defense,
the defendant is obligated to present
"some credible evidence" of self-defense. 22
The Colorado Supreme Court has consistently held that where there is any evidence tending to establish self-defense,
the defendant is entitled to have the jury
instructed with respect to that defense. 23
However, in the recent case of People v.
Wilner,24 the Supreme Court appeared
to retreat from this principle, at least on
the subsidiary issue of the no-retreat
doctrine. The defendant shot and killed
a man who was repossessing his car. The
defendant testified that he heard his car
backing out of the driveway and ran outside with a gun, that the car began to
drive toward him and that he retreated
and fired warning shots before firing the
fatal shot. Other evidence contradicted
these claims.
The Supreme Court found that the noretreat doctrine did not apply here because the record did not support the defendant's claim that he was not the initial aggressor or, that if he was, he withdrew and communicated his withdrawal
to the victim. The dissenting justice argued that the defendant's testimony was
all that was required to make applicable
the no-retreat doctrine and mandate an
instruction on the issue.
While the burden on the defendant to
present "some evidence" is a low burden,

rest 17 and menacing.' 8 The Colorado Su-

preme Court has not decided whether
self-defense can be used to defend against
the charge of prohibited use of weapons 19 or criminal mischief.20 In certain
circumstances, when more than two people are involved in a fight, aggressive acts
by one person may justify the use of force
21
against another person.
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it is not a meaningless one. The evidence
in People v. Williams 25 established that
the defendant's brother was involved in
a fight and that the defendant put a knife
to the throat of an onlooker and warned
him not to interfere, then got involved in
the fight himself. When the onlooker
tried to break up the fight, the defendant
put the knife to his throat again. The
Court of Appeals found this record devoid
of "any indication that the defendant
could have held a reasonable belief that
the man he threatened with the knife
was engaged in the imminent use of unlawful physical force against the defendant's brother."26 Therefore, no self-defense instruction was required.
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tack at that moment because of the cyclical nature of the violence by the batterer.
The jury acquitted the defendant of murder but found her guilty of conspiracy.
The prosecution appealed the trial
court rulings that allowed the defendant
to present self-defense to the jury. The
Court of Appeals disapproved the rulings and held that self-defense is simply
unavailable in the context of a contract
murder. While sympathetic to the battered woman syndrome, and while recognizing that such evidence is appropriate and important in many cases, the
court refused to stretch the meaning of
"imminent danger" to include this situation.

Imminent Danger
As noted, a person claiming self-de"Unless the prosecutions
fense must be responding to what the
person reasonably believes to be the use
case-in-chief raises evidence
or imminent use of unlawful physical
of self-defense, the
force against himself or herself. The Coldefendant is obligated to
orado Court of Appeals has held that selfdefense is not available in a contract murpresent 'some credible
der case. At first glance, this seems like
evidence' of self-defense."
an obvious and easy result to reach: if an
individual took the time to hire someone
to do the killing, it is hard to imagine that
the individual was in imminent danger.
This is not the time or place to discuss Retreat to the Wall
The Colorado Supreme Court considcontract law, but everyone knows how
difficult and protracted contract negoti- ered the retreat-to-the-wall doctrine in
ations can be. This is particularly true Idrogo v. People,2 in which the defendant
with hired killers. Obviously, any threat was accosted by two drunken men outwould be long over well before the actu- side a liquor store who asked for drugs.
The defendant and his companion real hit took place.
However, when this issue was raised fused and attempted to leave. When the
in People v. Yaklich, 27 it was not quite as men followed them, the defendant pulled
simple as it seemed. The defendant was a knife and warned the men to go away.
the wife of a police officer who was shot They did not, a fight ensued, and the deto death in the driveway of the family fendant stabbed one of the men to death.
home while she lay sleeping inside. A pair The defendant was convicted of reckless
of young men who lived nearby were sub- manslaughter.
sequently arrested, and these men told
On appeal, all parties agreed that a
the police they had been hired by the de- general self-defense instruction was apfendant to kill her husband. The defen- propriate. All parties also agreed that a
dant admitted she had hired the men, but general retreat-to-the-wall instruction
claimed that she hired them because she was appropriate. However, the prosecuwas in great fear for her life. She claimed tion argued that the instruction that was
that her husband beat her regularly and given to the jury went too far. The prosthat she was afraid to go to the police be- ecution argued that while there is no
cause her husband was, after all, a police general duty to retreat, there is a duty
to retreat before employing deadly force,
officer.
The defendant was allowed to present and that the jury should be so instructed.
The Supreme Court rejected this arevidence of self-defense, including expert
testimony about the battered wife syn- gument and concluded that "an innocent
drome. The expert testimony suggested victim of an assault is not bound to rethat a woman2 who suffers from the syn- treat before using deadly force when the
drome can quite reasonably be in fear use of such force is reasonable under the
for her safety even if she is not under at- circumstances." 30The principle that there
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is no duty to retreat applies regardless
of the level of force an individual uses to
defend himself or herself. It is important
to remember that there is always a requirement that the amount of force used
be appropriate. A person must be in fear
of imminent serious bodily injury or death
before he or she can use deadly force to
defend. However, a person who is in fear
of serious bodily injury or death need not
retreat before using deadly force.

Apparent Necessity
The question in Hare v. People31 and
Beckett v. People3 2 was whether the standard self-defense instruction adequately
conveyed to the jury the "apparent necessity" doctrine. The apparent necessity doctrine holds that an apparent need
to defend oneself, if reasonably grounded, justifies the use of self-defense to the
same extent as actual necessity. A fourperson majority of the Supreme Court
reached the conclusion that an instruction that tracks CRS § 18-1-704 adequately instructs the jury on the doctrine.
The court in Hare held that the selfdefense statute takes into account the
reasonable belief of an individual who
has exercised force in self-defense. It encompasses the apparent necessity doctrine and allows the "jury to consider
from the defendant's viewpoint whether
the defendant was justified in using physical force in self-defense ....

,,34 Thus,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in rejecting the more detailed instruction
tendered by the defendant. The three dissenters argued that the instruction that
was given did not clearly inform the jury
of the defendant's right to act on appearances.

The Mens Rea Issue
The self-defense statute justifies the
use of force only if a person reasonably
believes there is imminent danger and
only to the extent that the person uses a
reasonable degree of force. Therefore, a
person who is properly using force to defend himself or herself is, by definition,
acting reasonably. At the same time, the
analysis should take into account the
fact that "detached reflection cannot be
demanded in the presence of an uplifted
knife."- If the mens rea requirement of
a particular offense is less than reasonableness-such as recklessness, negligence or strict liability--should a defendant still be allowed to claim self-defense?
The Supreme Court has held that selfdefense is not available against a charge
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of reckless manslaughter or criminally
negligent homicide because a finding of
recklessness or negligence necessarily
precludes a finding that the defendant
acted reasonably.36 Recklessness involves
a conscious disregard of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk; negligence involves a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care resulting in a failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk.3 7 Both states of mind are
inconsistent with reasonableness. Even
though a defendant who is charged with
a reckless or negligent offense is not entitled to a self-defense instruction, evidence of self-defense may still be presented in an effort to persuade the jury that
the conduct was not reckless or negligent.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals has
held that self-defense is not available
against a charge of extreme indifference
murder.38 Extreme indifference murder
requires evidence of universal malice
manifesting an extreme indifference toward human life generally. This mens
rea requirement has been interpreted to
mean aggravated or extremely reckless
conduct.3 9 A finding of such conduct necessarily precludes a finding that the defendant acted reasonably in self-defense.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court
has held that self-defense is available
against charges of heat of passion manslaughter 4" and attempted heat of passion manslaughter. 41 Distinguishing
reckless manslaughter from heat of passion manslaughter, the court noted that
even a reasonable person may react instinctively and passionately to a great
provocation. 42 The heat of passion principle simply recognizes this human frailty.

lishing an affirmative defense. Based on
this difference, the Supreme Court held
that the burden of proving the applicability of the statute rests on the defendant, who must prove applicability by a
preponderance of the evidence. 4" Resolution of the issue should be conducted by
way of a pretrial hearing. Conflicting evidence as to the applicability of the statute must be resolved by the trial court,
and appellate courts will defer to the trial court's findings. 44 A defendant who loses at the pretrial hearing may still present self-defense to the jury."
It is generally assumed that the "make
my day" defense is available against the
full range of charges in which self-defense is available, as discussed above.
Appellate decisions have held the defense available against charges of firstdegree murder, 46 second-degree murder,47 first-degree assault, 48 second- and
49
third-degree assault
and heat of pas50
sion manslaughter.
Several of the terms in the statute have
been litigated. The term "dwelling" is defined in CRS § 18-1-901(3)(g) as "a building which is used, intended to be used, or
usually used by a person for habitation."
In People v. Cushinberry,51 the Court of

The "Make My Day" Defense
The "make my day" statute creates certain additional rights of self-defense. CRS
§ 18-1-704.5 provides that the occupant
of a dwelling is justified in using any degree of physical force against a person
who has unlawfully entered the dwelling,
if the occupant reasonably believes that
the intruder has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime in addition to the unlawful entry, and also reasonably believes that the intruder might
use any physical force against any occupant.
The statute goes further than other
forms of self-defense by providing for immunity from prosecution (as well as from
civil liability), rather than merely estab-
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17. People v. Fuller, 781 P.2d 647 (Colo.
Appeals held that a defendant sitting on on the question. The concurring opinion
a windowsill in his apartment building argued that the appropriate definition of 1989).
18. Beckett v. People, 800 P.2d 74 (Colo.
was not entitled to the protection of the unlawful entry was "an entry into a dwell1990).
statute because the stairwell, which was ingin violation of criminal law." The dis19. Id. at 75, n.1; but see People v. Beckett,
a common area and not part of the de- sent argued that the majority was ignor- 782 P2d 812 (Colo.App. 1989).
fendant's apartment, did not constitute ing the plain language of the statute and
20. People v. Smith, 754 P.2d 1168, 1169,
a dwelling for the purposes of the stat- engaging in judicial legislation.
n.2 (Colo. 1988).
All three opinions contain significant
ute.
21. People v. Jones,675 P2d 9 (Colo. 1984);
The phrase "unlawful entry" also has discussions of the statute and should be People v. Auldridge, 724 P.2d 87 (Colo.App.
been the subject of litigation. The Court read by anyone with a "make my day" 1986).
22. CRS § 18-1-407.
of Appeals has held that a person who case.
23. Idrogo, supra, note 13 at 754.
invited another into his home could not
24. 879 P.2d 19 (Colo. 1994).
claim the protection of the statute be- Conclusion
25. 827 P.2d 612 (Colo.App. 1992).
cause an invitee does not make an unThe right of self-defense has strong
26. Id. at 614.
52
lawful entry. The trial court had inter- roots in both history and the law. The ba27. 833 P.2d 758 (Colo.App. 1991).
preted the phrase "unlawful entry" to sic parameters of the defense, set out by
28. A man may suffer from the syndrome
include the concept, familiar from bur- statute, have remained unchanged for as well, but the overwhelming majority ofvicglary cases, of remaining unlawfully af- some time. Perhaps reflecting this state's tims are women.
ter an initially proper entry. However, frontier history, Colorado does not im29. Idrogo, supra,note 13.
30. Id. at 755.
the Court of Appeals noted that the leg- pose a duty to retreat, even when deadly
31. 800 P2d 1317 (Colo. 1990).
islature did not include the "remain law- force is employed; analyzes self-defense
32. 800 P.2d 74 (Colo. 1990).
fully" language in the "make my day" from the point of view of the person be33. People v. LaVoie, 395 P.2d 1001 (Colo.
statute.
ing attacked; and has created special ex1964);
Young v. People, 107 P. 274 (Colo. 1910).
53
In People v. Malczewski, the defen- emptions from liability for self-defense
34. Hare,supra, note 31 at 1319.
dant used force against a police officer exercised in the home. Nonetheless, there
35. People v. Young, 825 P.2d 1004, 1008
who was attempting to enter the defen- are limits on the use of this defense, and (Colo.App. 1991), quoting Brown v. United
dant's home to follow up on a report of a practitioners on both sides of a case must States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921).
baby in danger inside the home. The tri- familiarize themselves with the case law
36. Case v. People,774 P2d 866 (Colo. 1989);
al court found that the officer's entry was to prosecute and defend these cases prop- People v. Fink, 574 P.2d 81 (Colo. 1978).
37. CRS § 18-1-501(3) and (8).
illegal and that the defendant could rea- erly. Finally, there are a number of evi38. People v. Fernandez,883 P.2d 491 (Colo.
sonably have believed that the officer was dentiary issues that commonly arise in
about to commit the crime of kidnapping. self-defense cases, and counsel must re- App. 1994).
39. People v. Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223 (Colo.
The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that view this law as well.
1988).
the entry was lawful under the exigent
40. Sanchez v. People, 820 P.2d 1103 (Colo.
circumstances exception to the warrant
NOTES
1991).
requirement and finding no evidence to
41. Thomas v. People, 820 P.2d 656 (Colo.
support a reasonable belief that the offi1. CRS § 18-1-704(1).
1991).
2. CRS § 18-1-704.5.
cer was about to commit a crime.
42. Sanchez, supra,note 40 at 1109-10.
3. CRS § 18-1-705.
The most recent Supreme Court dis43. People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971 (Colo.
4. CRS § 18-1-706.
1987).
cussion of the "unlawful entry" language
5. CRS § 18-1-707.
44. Young, supra,note 35.
occurred in People v. McNeese.54 The issue
6. CRS § 18-1-710.
45. People v. Malczewski, 744 P.2d 62 (Colo.
was whether an entry in violation of an
7. People v. Huckleberry, 768 P.2d 1235
1987); Guenther,supra,note 43 at n.1.
oral agreement in a lease constituted an
(Colo. 1989).
46. Young v. District Court, 740 P.2d 982
unlawful entry. The trial court granted
8. CRS § 18-1-407.
(Colo. 1987).
the defendant immunity from prosecu9. People v. Fincham, 799 P.2d 419 (Colo.
47. People v. McNeese, 892 P.2d 304 (Colo.
tion on the ground that the entry was un- App. 1990).
1995).
lawful, but the Supreme Court reversed
10. Id.
48. People v. Arrellano, 743 P.2d 431 (Colo.
11. People v. Tapia, 515 P.2d 453 (Colo. 1987).
and remanded. A majority of the court
held that the appropriate question is 1973); Chacon v. People,488 P.2d 56 (Colo.
49. Malczewski, supra,note 45.
50. Young, supra,note 35.
whether the entry was "a knowing viola- 1971).
12. Enyart v. People, 67 Colo. 434, 180 P
51. 855 P2d 18 (Colo.App. 1992).
tion of the criminal law." The court also
52. People v. Drennon, 860 P.2d 589 (Colo.
held that the appearance of an unlawful 722(1919).
13. Idrogo v. People, 818 P.2d 752 (Colo. App. 1992).
entry does not satisfy this standard: 1991).
53. Supra, note 45.
there must be an actual unlawful entry.
54. Supra, note 47.
14. Id. at 755-56.
While the court suggested that this
15. People v. Duran, 577 P.2d 307 (Colo.
entry, in violation of the lease agreement, App. 1978).
did not meet this standard, the court re16. People v. Burns, 686 P.2d 1360 (Colo.
manded the case for further proceedings App. 1984); CRS § 18-3-102(2).

Need CLE credits? Check out our 1995 CBA Convention audiotapes!
Call Dana Vocate at the CBA office: (303) 860-1115 or (800) 332-6736.
2720 /THE COLORADO
LAwYER I DECEMBER
1995/VOL. 24, No. 12

